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4.1 Evidentiality: a ‘grammar-only’ category? 
The adjective featured in the title of this chapter (‘extragrammatical’) undoubtedly requires 
preliminary caveats and disclaimers. Using this term implies a neat distinction between grammar 
and ‘extra-grammar’, a point that cannot be taken for granted in all of the various streams of 
contemporary linguistics. Setting this debated boundary ultimately depends on the theoretical 
perspective one adheres to and no solution can be assumed as generally applicable. But even 
admitting that the boundary were clearly set, the real problem is whether evidentiality crosses this 
boundary or not, i.e. whether evidentiality only covers grammar or can be extended to lexical 
phenomena. As will be shown in Section 4.3, other grammatical categories might be affected by 
similar difficulties, which, however, are particularly apparent in dealing with evidentiality, a notion 
whose ‘discovery’ took place in a moment in the history of linguistics in which a rigid structural 
account of grammar used to be dominant. Apart from unsystematic recognition in previous studies 
on Turkish and Albanian (Friedman 2003: 189, 192–193, 213; 2010: 24), evidentiality was 
introduced by early American ‘ethno-structuralism’ (Boas 1911, 1938; Sapir 1921: 114–115; see 
also Chapter 1) in a landscape that was dominated by a major interest in grammatical properties, 
with a special focus on ethnical peculiarities of still undescribed languages. Inflectional markers of 
information source in local languages attracted the attention of American ethno-linguists, who were 
particularly interested in those structural peculiarities that might emphasize the differences with 
respect to what was traditionally known from well described Indo-European languages. This 
historical imprint has permanently marked evidentiality as an ‘exotic’ category, whose prototype 
was to be found in those very special systems. 
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But on the other hand, the revitalization of the studies on evidentiality set in motion by 
Chafe and Nichols (1986) paved the way for a more extensive perspective, in which evidentiality is 
not only restricted to what is ‘formally’ coded by the core of grammatical systems but is also 
intended as a more general ‘functional category’ expressed by different means, which include 
lexical elements sharing the same semantic content as the grammatical morphemes discovered in 
native American languages. Chafe (1986) makes explicit this functional approach by reviewing 
various lexical and (semi)grammatical elements that allow a non-exotic language like English to 
compensate the lack of a fully developed grammatical system of evidential markers. The 
comparative hints between Iroquoian and English proposed by Mithun (1986: 89–90) also prelude 
to a functional perspective made possible by the comparison of systems in which evidentiality is 
expressed by different exponents. The crucial consequence of positing a comprehensive functional 
perspective is that evidentiality can be extended outside the rigid domain of grammar and the very 
notion of ‘lexical evidentiality’, i.e. the lexical expression of information source, becomes possible, 
a claim that is explicitly challenged by those who advocate for a ‘grammar-only’ conception 
(Aikhenvald 2004, 2007).  
Structuralists’ focus on grammar and Chafe’s (1986) functional approach coexist today in 
the current stream of studies on evidentiality, which, despite its always increasing scope, is still 
divided between a ‘grammar-only’ conception and the extensive idea of ‘all-purpose evidentiality’. 
The bifurcation between these perspectives is particularly apparent when it combines with different 
conceptions concerning what really belongs to grammar and where ‘extra-grammar’ starts from. 
This is clear if one compares Aikhenvald’s (2004, 2007) strict adherence to a ‘grammar only’ 
conception and the functional approach followed, among many others, in Pietrandrea’s (2007, 
2008) analyses of Italian epistemic-evidential adverbs and adverbial constructions, whose ‘lexical 
paradigm’ is described in its structural similarities to an isomorphic ‘grammatical paradigm’ 
expressed by inflectional verb forms and modals. Similarly, Boye (2012: 87) considers German 
adverbs as belonging to a ‘morphosyntactic system’ based on common distributional properties, 
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which make German(ic) lexical expressions comparable to fully-fledged grammatical systems of 
evidential and epistemic forms. As is spelled out in Aikhenvald’s (2007: 227, fn. 6), these different 
approaches epitomize divergent visions of the boundaries of grammar, which cannot be reduced to a 
unitary account without violating their theoretical conceptions. Considered from a historiographical 
point of view, these divergences are particularly intriguing for they crosscut the distinction between 
functionalist and formalist accounts. Within a functionalist perspective Diewald and Smirnova 
(2010a) have most explicitly interpreted evidentiality as a ‘semantic-functional domain’, in which 
different linguistic means equally contribute to express evidential meanings. But even hard 
formalist perspectives (see Cinque’s (1999) syntactic ‘cartography’) include lexical adverbs as 
‘functional heads’ with evidential meaning (inferences, reports, etc.), which, similarly to 
grammatical morphemes, are arranged in a hierarchical model that predicts constraints on their 
linear order. From this point of view, Cinque’s formalist program is very different from the 
perspective adopted by functionalist approaches followed by Van Valin and La Polla (1997), Ramat 
and Ricca (1998), Narrog (2009). But in fact, they share a conception of syntax as a multilayered 
domain in which verb morphology and lexical items jointly contribute to a comprehensive 
‘functional’ arrangement of the clause. The result is that both formalist syntax and functionalist 
accounts extensively elaborate on ‘lexical evidentiality’ as an unproblematic notion. 
 
4.2 Between grammar and lexicon: grammaticalization and evidentiality strategies 
Obviously, also those who advocate for a neat separation between grammatical and 
extragrammatical evidentiality have to handle verbs indicating evidential sources and modes of 
knowing, like English say, see and assume or adverbs like German angeblich ‘apparently’ and 
adverbial constructions like Italian secondo Gianni ‘according to John’. Aikhenvald (2007) admits 
their relevance but only as ‘lexical expressions of information source’, which can most interestingly 
be studied from a cross-cultural perspective (Aikhenvald and Storch 2013). As they gradually 
grammaticalize, these lexical markers become part of (semi)closed classes of particles and modals, 
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which are ‘evidential in the making’ (Aikhenvald 2007: 220). Thus, a decategorialized form of a 
verb meaning ‘say’ used as a marker of reportativity (e. g., Latin American dizque, Chapter 32), 
albeit not belonging to grammar in a strict sense, is considered by Aikhenvald (2007: 218-220) as 
an ‘evidentiality strategy’. Consistently with her conception of evidentiality as independent from 
other categories (especially crucial is the boundary with epistemic modality, cf. Chapter 8), 
Aikhenvald (2003a: 18–20; 2004) prototypically applies the notion of evidentiality strategy to those 
grammatical phenomena that, even though belonging to modality, mood and other grammatical 
categories, do acquire additional evidential meanings. The usage of the Romance conditional mood 
as a reportative marker of second-hand knowledge, often combined with different degrees of 
epistemic distance, is a typical representative of an ‘evidentiality strategy’ (Aikhenvald 2004: 106-
107).  
The very idea of ‘evidentiality strategy’ suggests some form of secondary, possibly 
pragmatic, extensions that participate to the general evidential ‘make up’ of the utterance. In 
Aikhenvald’s perspective, evidentiality strategy is an umbrella covering what is, generally speaking, 
peripheral with respect to the core of evidential grammar, either because belonging to the grammar 
of other categories or because not fully grammaticalized. It is not surprising that in dealing with 
grammaticalization (see also Chapter 9) ‘grammar-only’ conceptions and ‘all-purpose evidentiality’ 
tend to reduce their distance. Albeit only in the secondary form of an evidentiality strategy, a 
grammaticalizing item that expresses reportivity and inferentiality is somehow admitted among 
‘evidentials’ even in grammar-only conceptions, as is also most naturally the case in those 
‘integrative’ accounts (Wiemer 2007, 2010; Giacalone Ramat and Topadze 2007) in which the 
balance between grammar and lexicon is not predefined, thus typically admitting intermediate 
elements.  
A step further along the cline between ‘grammar-only’ and ‘all-purpose’ evidentiality can be 
found in those ‘discourse grammars’ in which a rigid boundary between grammar and lexicon is 
totally blurred, by focusing on the interplay of evidential lexical items as discourse strategies that 
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complement the array of discourse markers (see also Chapters 11–12). Within this framework 
lexical items belonging to whatever part of speech all participate to modalizing the speaker’s 
interactional role (for a recent example of this perspective see González 2015). In some of these 
discourse-focused perspectives the relationship with the original grammatical notion is so loosened 
that the very term ‘evidentiality’ is dismissed in favor of the overarching notion of ‘stance’, which 
is “the linguistic mechanisms used by speakers and writers to convey their personal feelings and 
assessments” (Biber 2004: 109). Within these “linguistic mechanisms” Biber (2004) admits 
evidential (apparently) as well as epistemic adverbs (certainly) without distinguishing them from 
prototypical grammatical markers.  
 
4.3 Comparing evidentiality to other categories 
Biber’s conception of a ‘grammar of stance’ is totally incompatible with the original structuralistic 
tradition of keeping lexicon and grammar neatly separated. Being so diverse in their theoretical 
assumptions, any attempt at comparing these opposite perspectives, let alone their reconciliation, 
would be a sterile exercise. Nevertheless, we should also keep in mind that the point dealt with here 
on the boundary between lexicon and grammar is not, in principle, restricted to evidentiality, being 
instead a potential problem for all grammatical categories. Thus, it is not surprising that in the 
literature on evidentiality we do find attempts at settling this issue by comparing evidentiality to 
other linguistic categories with similar features. These are the so-called TAM categories and one of 
the most apparent signs of the increasingly flourishing interest towards evidentiality is indeed the 
revision of this acronym, which was recently extended as to include E(videntiality) as its fourth 
initial (TAME). This might suggest an amenable way-out from the sterile deadlock caused by the 
confrontation between a strict ‘grammar only’ and a more liberal ‘all-inclusive’ perspective. The 
argument that can be derived from the TAM(E) extension is rather obvious: assuming that 
evidentiality has equal status as the other categories of the acronym, why don’t we look at our 
6 
 
 
 
general understanding of the relationship between a grammar-only perspective and all-inclusive 
functionalism as is settled for the other categories?  
As observed by Aikhenvald (2007: 221), nobody seems to doubt that time and tense are two 
different notions, the former being a conceptual category and the latter its grammatical counterpart. 
Consistently with this view, yesterday and today are time adverbs, whereas the grammatical 
opposition between the English verb forms is going and was going codifies tense. If applied to 
evidentiality, this terminological neatness very naturally leads to Aikhenvald’s ‘grammar only’ 
perspective, in which evidentiality is only made of uncontroversial grammatical morphemes, 
marginally including evidentiality strategies.  
However, those who follow an all-inclusive functionalism might also provide similarly 
compelling arguments. The clear time / tense bifurcation only refers to the first initial of the TAM 
acronym. If we look at the other grammatical categories typically expressed in the verb, the 
distinction grammar vs lexicon becomes much fuzzier. This complication is particularly apparent in 
considering the final letter, M, whose meaning is much less clear than T(ense) and A(spect). 
Consistently with the assumption that the categories contained in the acronym should in principle 
refer to what is typically expressed by verb morphemes, M was originally intended as the initial for 
Mood (see e.g. Dahl 1985: 1), But more recently, has also been interpreted as M(odality) (Brisard 
and Patard 2011: 1). Obviously, the way of intending M makes a great difference in terms of a 
comparison with evidentiality. Mood is very different from evidentiality, which has a clear semantic 
reference (it denotes source of information / mode of knowing), whereas mood has strict 
correlations to syntax (‘subordinating moods’) and pragmatics (some moods have special 
illocutionary force, e.g. the imperative mood), but poor semantic stability (see the vexed 
grammatical question on the core semantics of the subjunctive mood). Being so 
morphosyntactically and pragmatically anchored, mood is, by definition, a grammatical category, 
which, in principle, should not exist extragrammatically (for a recent overview see Thieroff 2010). 
In this respect, the behavior of mood corroborates the assumption that TAM categories should be 
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restricted to notions with definite grammatical exponents. But the opposite applies when M is 
interpreted as the initial of modality, a category that, considering the debate on its correlations to 
evidentiality, should more naturally be seen as the direct area of interest in dealing with 
evidentiality. The intricacies of the relationship between modality and evidentiality have constantly 
made problematic the study of these two domains (Chapter 8), which, in some accounts, are 
considered as belonging to the same macrocategory (see, among many others, Palmer 2001 and 
Boye 2012). This debate also has consequences on the different conceptions of the boundaries 
between grammatical and extragrammatical phenomena. Modality is typically conceived as a 
‘supercategory’ (Nuyts 2006: 2) acting at different layers in which grammatical and lexical 
elements are variedly involved. The adverb perhaps is currently defined as an ‘epistemic adverb’ 
and nobody seems to have objections to the assumption that it belongs to ‘modality’, which implies 
that modality can be expressed lexically.  
The point now is whether we claim that evidentiality should be considered more similar to 
tense and mood or to modality. If we stress the similarity to tense and mood, lexical evidentiality 
should not exist. Its nature would be equally inconsistent as ‘lexical tense’ and ‘lexical mood’, 
whose incoherent nature seems to be tacitly assumed. On the contrary, for those who consider that 
evidentiality should find its direct counterpart in modality there is no contradiction in admitting 
lexical expressions of evidentiality. In this respect, it is probably not a chance that among the most 
strenuous defendants of the independence between evidentiality and modality we do find those who 
also criticize the very existence of something called ‘lexical evidentiality’. Aikhenvald (2004) is an 
explicit representative of the consistency between the two positions. On the other hand, this is not 
tantamount to saying that those who admit the very notion of lexical evidentiality, necessarily 
consider evidentiality and epistemic modality as two faces of the same category. Take, among 
others, Diewald and Smirnova (2010a: 1–2), who clearly combine the interpretation of evidentiality 
as a “semantic-functional domain” with the assumption that evidentiality “is not a sub-division of 
epistemic modality”.  
8 
 
 
 
As is apparent from the above discussion, no consensus can be derived by simply comparing 
evidentiality to the other TAM categories. The intricate relationship that especially involves 
modality does not provide conclusive results. But whatever scope of evidentiality one might have in 
mind, there are still significant empirical lessons that can be drawn from a comparison between 
what is expressed by the core of grammar and what is instead expressed by other linguistics means, 
which may be more or less external to grammar and variously intended as belonging to a general 
comprehensive notion. Therefore, the aim of the rest of this chapter is to investigate whether the 
study of ‘extragrammatical’ phenomena provides a different picture from what we already know 
from grammatical systems or, on the contrary, the same evidential notions applied to grammars also 
extend to lexical phenomena. This is, first of all, an empirical question that might enrich our 
understanding of evidentiality and, ironically, might be of more interest for those who posit a clear-
cut boundary between grammar and extra-grammar. If the empirical study of lexical phenomena 
should highlight substantial differences between grammar and extra-grammar, the very idea of such 
a boundary would be corroborated.  
But comparing lexical and grammatical expressions is not only a practical way out from the 
difficulties of the theoretical problem whether lexical evidentiality exists or not. It is also a general 
option inspired by another letter of the acronym TAME that I have not considered so far. The initial 
A is also object of a certain debate: it definitely stands for ‘Aspect’, which, however, can be 
intended as a grammatical category or as a more general functional category also expressed by 
lexical items. Aktionsart, types of actions, actionality as well as ‘lexical aspect’ (Smith 1991) are 
notions that have been intended as covering lexical areas or areas intermediate between lexicon and 
grammar. If ‘lexical aspect’ exists, the real challenging point is whether what is expressed lexically 
is semantically different from what is expressed by grammatical morphemes. This observation is the 
starting point for all the discussions on the difference between ‘durativity’ and ‘imperfectivity’ and 
between ‘telicity’ and ‘perfectivity’. In this perspective, it becomes clear that the discussion 
developed in the previous sections ceases to be a theoretical option based on different degrees of 
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adherence to ‘old structuralism’, eventually becoming a crucial issue affecting the balance between 
lexicon and grammar. This is a point discussed by Boye and Harder (2009) and elaborated in 
Squartini (2008) as well as in Michael’s (2014) study on the interactional pragmatics of Nanti 
quotative markers, among which a lexical verb of saying coexists with a grammaticalized 
evidential. 
 
4.4 What do we learn from extragrammatical phenomena? 
From time to time a fresh look at lexical material turns out to be extremely helpful in clarifying 
those thorny issues that affect ever-lasting debates on the boundaries between evidentiality and 
epistemicity. Take for instance the English adverbs certainly, probably, probably not, certainly not, 
which indisputably represent “an estimation of the likelihood” that a given state of affairs occurs 
(Nuyts 2001: 21) and can therefore be arranged along an epistemic scale (apart from Nuyts 2001, 
see also Hengeveld 1989: 138 and Boye 2012: 43–47). If one compares the different degrees of 
certainty expressed by these genuinely epistemic adverbs to the evidential meaning characterizing 
the English adverbs of indirect mode of knowing (e.g. allegedly and reportedly, cf. Ramat 1996), 
the distinction between epistemic degree of confidence and evidential source of knowledge appears 
particularly clear. But once we gradually move into grammar by considering intermediate items 
between lexical and grammar status (modals, particles), these neat distinctions tend to blur. What is 
particularly telling of the complexities triggered by (semi)grammatical elements is the varied array 
of analyses proposed for Germanic modals, which, despite their traditional interpretation as 
epistemic markers, have also been considered either as evidential (see Mortelmans’ 2000 account of 
German müssen) or as representatives of an overlapping area between epistemicity and evidentiality 
(van der Auwera and Plungian 1998), where epistemic markers develop evidential extensions (Boye 
2012: 152). Within these discussions the consistent epistemic nature of English must has also been 
reappraised (de Haan 2005: 14; 2006: 58–59) by contrasting it to its Dutch cognate moeten, whose 
genuine evidentiality is considered uncontroversial due to the coexistence of inferentiality and 
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hearsay (indirect evidentiality) in one and the same modal. Apart from modals, comparable 
complexities also characterize ‘particles’ or ‘adverbs’ (Wiemer 2010: 90–91) that, albeit originally 
evidential, tend to develop epistemic overtones as they grammaticalize by showing signs of 
decategorialization. This is what happens to Latin-American dizque (see Section 4.2 and Chapter 
32) and many other items such as those described in Lithuanian by Wiemer (2007). While girdì, a 
petrified form of the verb ‘hear’, is restricted to reports without any epistemic overtones, the 
‘adverb’ tariamai, even though derived from a neutral verb of saying, can hardly occur without 
epistemic overtones with respect to the reported content, and in many other markers described by 
Wiemer evidential meaning and epistemic overtones coexist, making it difficult to draw the line 
between semantic content and pragmatic implicatures. But the analysis of these ‘evidentiality 
strategies’ might be biased by grammaticalization, which suggests that, if we want to explore the 
peculiarities of extragrammatical phenomena, we should look at the core of lexicon. In this 
perspective, direct perception verbs might be particularly interesting. They are undoubtedly lexical, 
but at the same time, being expressions of direct evidence, they are also prototypical in terms of 
evidentiality. The analysis of perception verbs in Section 4.4.1 will prepare the background for 
SEEM-verbs (Section 4.4.2), in which direct perception is filtered by the speaker’s subjective 
evaluation. The role of the speaker as a ‘mediating filter’ between epistemic estimation and source 
of evidence will also be discussed with respect to verbs of belief (Section 4.4.3), whose varied 
interpretations are another manifestation of the evidential / epistemic diatribe. By underscoring the 
role of the speaker as primary source of direct evidence but also as a ‘subjective filter’ of perceptual 
data, I will concentrate on those lexical expressions that involve the speaker’s senses (I see, I hear) 
as well as impressions (It seems to me) and beliefs (I think), thus neglecting the important lexical 
area covered by verba dicendi. Their role is undoubtedly significant as lexical exponents of indirect 
reports; yet, they have been more interestingly studied either as (semi)grammatical evidentiality 
strategies (e.g. Latin-American dizque etymologically contains a verb of saying) or in terms of 
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textual construal of indirect speech (Güldemann and von Roncador 2002) rather than from the point 
of view of their lexical semantics as markers of information source. 
 
4.4.1 Perception verbs: direct and indirect evidence 
In his comparative analysis of English and German Whitt (2010a, 2010b) shows how a verb that 
typically expresses physical perception (English see) can be extended towards inferential meanings 
(1) and “metaphorical denotations of knowledge and understanding” (2): 
 
(1) I see you are dying with curiosity to know what has excited my anger, which I consider both 
inquisitive and impertinent. (Whitt 2010b: 265) 
 
(2)  When I was with him I was always puzzled and uneasy, and always wondering why on earth 
he had ever married Dottie or rather how Dottie had ever arranged it, but I could see why he 
liked the family publishing business. It was a sort of ivory tower for him […] (Whitt 2010b: 
268) 
 
The semantic extension from physical and concrete to mental and abstract can easily be arranged 
within traugottian subjectification, which, in this case, is independent from grammaticalization. 
However, what is more relevant in the present perspective is the sheer fact that (1) and (2), despite 
their ‘indirect’ and subjective meaning, contain the same lexical entry that elsewhere occurs as a 
verb of objective direct perception (see). This is patently at odds with the assumption that the most 
fundamental distinction within evidentiality opposes direct perception vs indirect knowledge, the 
speaker’s assumptions typically belonging to the domain of indirect knowledge (see Aikhenvald’s 
2003b: 139 ‘generic inferences’). As suggested by Grossmann and Tutin (2010: 287–288, 304, fn. 
10) in their study of French voir ‘see’ in scientific writing, a neat distinction between perceptual 
stimuli and cognitive dimension might be difficult to disentangle especially with lexical perception 
verbs, in which ‘recognition and deduction’ are strictly intertwined (on voit bien dans ce schéma 
que ‘this diagram clearly shows that (lit. in this diagram one sees well that’). Rather radically, 
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Grossmann and Tutin (2010: 283–284) suggest that it is precisely this combination of indirect 
understanding and direct perception that should be considered as the genuine ‘evidential’ meaning 
of perception verbs, in which the speaker is also intellectually involved as a source and not as a 
mere ‘perceiver’ of external data. 
 Now, the empirical question that might be derived from these observations is whether the 
coexistence of direct and indirect evidence is only possible due to the lexical nature of the verb see 
or is a phenomenon that also extends to grammatical systems, thus unexpectedly blurring the direct 
/ indirect opposition. Per se, it comes as no surprise that this boundary can be crossed, if one 
considers that indirect evidence (especially in inferential reasoning) are prototypically based on 
external data directly perceived by the speaker (‘circumstantial inferences’ Anderson 1986: 274: 
The light is on; he must be at home). The same also applies to auditory evidence, expressed e.g. by 
the English lexical verb hear (Whitt 2009), which not only covers direct evidence but also second-
hand knowledge acquired through ‘hearsay’. Thus, the point is not whether the coexistence of 
indirect and direct evidence is semantically possible, but how it impacts on grammatical systems 
and on our understanding of them. A look at Willett’s (1988: 57), Aikhenvald’s (2004: ch. 2) and 
(Boye 2012) typologies, which all invoke the fundamental distinction direct / indirect opposition, 
seems to confirm the general tendency of grammars to keep this distinction clearly divided. As the 
A2 type in Aikhenvald’s (2004: 65) classification reminds us, there are, in fact, grammatical 
markers that cut across the fundamental distinction direct vs indirect, but in these cases only non-
visual markers of direct evidence pattern together with inferentials, thus confirming a fundamental 
distinction between what is visually perceived and what, being perceived through other senses, can 
be categorized as more indirect. But apart from non-visual markers, there is another a point in 
which Aikhenvald’s (2004: ch. 5) careful survey of the semantics of grammatical systems might 
provide us something comparable to the behavior of the English verb see in (1–2). In her data 
Aikhevald (2004: 186–193) highlights cases in which ‘direct’ evidentials not only express firsthand 
sensory perceptions but also cover the speaker’s ‘internal experience’, including ‘thoughts and 
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knowledge’. This is what happens, among other languages, in Quechua (Floyd 1999: 63–64, 
Aikhenvald 2004: 160), which leads Aikhenvald (2004: 186–193) to recognize the speaker’s 
internal thoughts as a possible additional meaning of ‘firsthand’, ‘visual’ and ‘direct’ markers. Also 
Boye’s (2012: 138) semantic map admits neutralization between direct and indirect evidence, but 
this typically correlates with an epistemic bias towards reliability. Lega (Botne 1997) and Supyire 
(Carlson 1994) have markers covering direct perception as well as indirect inferences. However, 
this combination is only made possible when the speaker also asserts full reliability, thus 
recognizing to the speaker “a kind of proto-evidential capacity to code higher certainty” (Carlson 
1994: 365), irrespective of the mode of knowing.  
 These forms of encroaching of the speaker’s internal interpretation and / or epistemic 
persuasions on direct perception might support other classificatory systems of evidentiality (see the 
discussion in Squartini 2001) in which the primary division is not direct vs indirect but the 
speaker’s SELF vs OTHER (Frawley 1992: 412–413), which Plungian (2010: 29) dubs personal vs 
non-personal. 
On the other hand, it is the syntactic distribution of English perception verbs, which, by 
forming a special ‘morphosyntactic system’ (Boye 2012), confirm the tendency to develop a special 
syntactic grammar for direct perception, ultimately keeping it distinct from indirect interpretation of 
sensory data. As concluded in Whitt’s (2010b) corpus analysis, the construction in which the verb 
of perception is complemented by a non-finite dependent clause (I saw her pass through the room) 
“almost solely is marker of visual evidentiality”. A parallel development characterizes other verbs 
of perception (most typically, hear) with a similar tendency to specialize the non-finite construction 
for direct perception (“I heard John cross the street implies that I did hear John stamping his feet”, 
Aikhenvald 2007: 213), while the indirect interpretation of verbal report is triggered by the 
complementation with a finite clause (I heard that John crossed the street). Thus, grammar (here 
intended as morphosyntactic restrictions) seems to be particularly sensitive to the boundary direct 
vs indirect (for other examples in various languages see Aikhenvald 2004: 120–123 and for a 
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general interpretation of syntactic complementation in evidential terms see Boye 2012: ch.4). What 
instead remains to be better understood is the relationship between speaker’s perceptions and 
speaker’s thoughts, which is a prominent feature of lexical semantics in visual verbs. Yet, its impact 
on grammatical systems might have been underestimated. 
 
4.4.2 External appearance and subjective interpretation: SEEM-verbs 
The interplay between external sensory data and speaker’s subjective interpretation highlighted 
above comes even more prominently to the foreground when one moves from perception verbs to 
verbs of ‘external appearance’ such as English appear, seem, look (you look tired). What ‘appears’ 
from direct perception is not necessarily claimed to be true and the balance between appearance and 
reality is exactly the cognitive mold on which the semantics of single verbs of this class variedly 
elaborate showing different degrees of subjective interpretation (Dixon 2005: 204; Usonienė 2000). 
The semantic connection between objective external appearance and subjective uncertainty can 
easily be demonstrated by looking at diachronic data. The Old Italian (second half of the 14th 
century) example in (3) shows that the verb pare, nowadays occurring as indirect evidential (pare 
che … ‘it seems that …’) as well as a marker of personal opinions (a me pare ‘it seems to me’), 
used to occur in a much more objective sense as anaphoric referential link to a point of a written 
text, where the referred fact appears, i.e. is documented, mentioned: 
 
(3) le quali chase si conperarono da Iacopo di Lapo Ghavaciani, come pare in questo libro a 
dietro a car(te) 2. (Libro di ricordanze dei Corsini 1362–1402, ed. by A. Petrucci, Rome, 
1965, p. 16) 
 ‘these houses were bought by I. di L. G., as recorded (lit. it appears) in this book above on 
page 2’ 
 
This usage as internal text-reference provides a possible connection to indirect evidentiality: pare 
refers here to the source of information (what is recorded elsewhere in the same book), which can 
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be twisted towards modern uses of the same verb as hearsay and inferential (‘indirective’ in 
general). The connection to evidentiality is confirmed by the English verb of appearance seem, 
which occurs as a copular verb (John seems happy) signalling personal opinions or impressions, 
with respect to which the speaker “is not fully certain whether the adjectival description is 
appropriate” (Dixon 2005: 204). Moreover, seem expresses hearsay (It seems that Sam’s in the 
hospital, Mithun 1986: 90) and inferences (John seems to be here now, Anderson 1986: 279), with a 
semantic dynamics similar to adverbs and adverbials derived from verbs of appearance (Eng. 
apparently, Fr. apparemment, It. a quanto pare, cf. Ramat 1996, Squartini 2008).  
These data involving different constructions of a copular verb also demonstrate that in dealing 
with SEEM-verbs we are again moving into an intermediate domain between lexicon and grammar, 
in which the boundary between the two might be difficult to assess (Cornillie 2007b). Diewald and 
Smirnova (2010b: 178, 187) consider the copular occurrences of German scheinen ‘seem’ as 
‘lexical uses’ (4), with respect to which inferential constructions (scheinen ‘seem’ + infinitive) are 
‘more grammaticalized’ (5): 
 
(4) Sie scheint traurig 
 ‘She seems sad’ 
(5) Gaigern scheint hier draußen Stammgast zu sein, jedermann grüßt und kennt ihn 
 ‘Gaigern seems to be a regular guest here, everyone greets and knows him 
  
Once more, it is morphosyntax that turns out to be sensitive to different evidential interpretations, as 
confirmed in analyses of SEEM-verbs in various languages (cf. Dendale and van Bogaert 2007 for 
the French pair paraître and sembler; de Haan 2007 on the relationship between grammaticalization 
and the special syntax of ‘raising verbs’ such as Eng. It seems that John is ill / John seems to be ill). 
In this perspective of syntax-semantics interface, Cornillie’s (2007a) diachronic and synchronic 
corpus-based accounts of the Spanish constructions with the verb parecer ‘seem’ have shown that 
the infinitival construction parece ‘seem’ + infinitive is restricted to one evidential mode of 
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knowing (inferences) as opposed to other syntactic structures (parece + complement clause, parece 
+ datival expression of the conceptualizer, parenthetical uses), which cover a wider array of 
subjective (belief) and intersubjective (hearsay) meanings.  
From a semantic point of view these tendencies involving SEEM-verbs confirm the strict 
functional correlation between inferentiality and hearsay / reports within the general domain of 
indirectivity, a point that is well known from typological studies on grammatical evidentiality since 
Willett (1988), with significant confirmation by Johanson and Utas (2000) and Aikhenvald (2004). 
In this sense, the study of lexical material does not add anything new to what is well assessed from 
research on grammatical systems. What, instead, might more fruitfully be derived from the 
semantics of SEEM-verbs in a general ‘evidential’ perspective is again a contribution to the 
discussion on the role of the speaker as a ‘conceptualizer’, who balances between direct and indirect 
knowledge and in this function can also express his / her own opinions, ‘beliefs’ and impressions (It 
seems to me). Thus, what is expressed by SEEM-verbs is not only how the speaker knows something 
but what the speaker thinks on the basis of external input, which, as demonstrated by the Old Italian 
example, may originally have a very objective and ‘sensory’ basis. Is this direct or indirect 
evidence? And what is the role of the speaker as evidential ‘filter’ between external data and 
internal conceptualizations? When Mary says to John You seem tired / sad, she is interpreting 
external (indirect) data on the basis of her own conceptualizations and similarity to a prototypical 
‘categorization’ (Kratschmer 2013). This should be an indisputable case of indirect evidentiality, 
but in fact if we look at how these notions are expressed in grammatical systems of evidential-
prominent languages, what we find is not conclusive. “[W]hen talking about the internal experience 
(emotions, thoughts, and the like) of someone other than the speaker” (Aikhenvald 2004: 161), as in 
You seem tired / sad, Quechua can use a grammatical marker of indirect inferentiality (something 
corresponding to English You must be tired expressed in Quechua by the inferential marker -chr, 
see Floyd 1999: 68–68), but the evidential marker of direct evidence –mi can also occur in contexts 
in which the speaker stresses personal certainty.  
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As opposed to the strong certainty conveyed by the selection of a marker of direct 
evidentiality in Quechua, the strategy adopted when using English seem underlines the epistemic 
uncertainty of the speaker, who signals potential discrepancy between the subjective interpretation 
of what externally appears and what is in fact true. As demonstrated by the analysis of data from a 
parallel corpus (Aijmer 2009), English seem may express different degrees of commitment to the 
factuality of the situation, including the creation of a fictitious interpretation that explicitly runs 
counter normal facts in the actual world (The door shook and the banging became so wild and 
erratic it seemed as if the wind and thunder wanted to be let in, from Aijmer 2009: 78).  
This comparison between Quechua grammatical markers and English seem clearly permits us to 
grasp the difference between ‘evidential- vs epistemic-prominent’ languages (van der Auwera and 
Amman 2005: 307, Boye 2012) and the various correlations between evidentiality and epistemicity 
that they imply. In evidential-prominent languages (Quechua) thoughts can be expressed by the 
evidential marker of direct perception, provided that the semantic interpretation also includes strong 
certainty. On the contrary, the marker used in an epistemic-prominent language (English seem) 
always conveys an ‘epistemic flavor’, which allows the speaker to ‘modalize’ his / her subjective 
commitment on the factuality of the situation. But if we take these data as a whole, English and 
Quechua demonstrate that the speaker thoughts are not per se ‘epistemic’ for they do not 
necessarily correlate with a lower degree of certainty. In English they do, but in Quechua they 
don’t, which obviously raises the problem whether what the speaker thinks should be considered 
epistemic or evidential.  
 
4.4.3 Verbs of belief: epistemic or evidential? 
Being ‘phenomenon-based’ (Viberg 2005), the verbs of appearance discussed above have clearly 
shown the interplay between the external phenomenon, which is directly perceived, and the 
speaker’s internal interpretation. Now, the role of the speaker as an internal conceptualizer becomes 
really crucial with ‘verbs of cognitive attitude’ (Cappelli 2007) such as I think, I guess, I suppose, 
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which can express subjective opinions and beliefs (Aijmer 1997), thus posing the problem whether 
the speaker should be interpreted as an evidential source or as an epistemic evaluator of states of 
affairs, who focuses on their reliability. Since the first studies on the relative syntactic freedom of 
these ‘parenthetical’ verbs (Urmson 1952), the epistemic interpretation connected to the truth 
commitment has been taken for granted. Nevertheless, these intrinsically ‘subjective’ elements 
(Nuyts 2005: 14) lack the scalar nature associated with genuine epistemic markers, which 
‘prototypically’ can be arranged along a continuum of different degrees of certainty (possibly, 
probably, certainly). At the same time, their evidential nature highlighted by Chafe’s (1986) notion 
of ‘belief’ is problematic due to the fact that ‘belief’ is the only ‘mode of knowing’ that lacks a 
‘source of evidence’, which implies that in this very special case the source should be identified 
with the ‘issuer of the evaluation’ (Nuyts 2005: 14). The interpretative duplicity of these verbs is 
also mirrored in Boye’s (2012) comprehensive reappraisal of the relationship between modal-
epistemic and evidential systems. Due to their common distributional features, Boye (2012 : 113) 
lists Danish mene ‘think’ among the other verbs (sige ‘say’, se ‘see’, synes ‘seem’) that form an 
‘evidential system’. Nonetheless, when defining the notion of ‘epistemic support’, he follows 
Caton’s (1969) classification, in which think lends its initial to the ‘T-group’ of epistemic qualifiers 
that express ‘partial epistemic support’, thus occupying an intermediate position along the epistemic 
scale (Boye 2012: 23).  
The controversial status of these verbs is also reflected in discourse analyses, where I think 
can be conflated with epistemic adverbs and modals, for it shares with them “the effect of damping 
down the force of what is said” (Coates 2003: 331). On the other hand, Kärkkäinen’s (2003: 53) 
conversational analysis distinguishes between markers of reliability (I don’t know, may be, 
probably, might, may, of course) and belief (I think, I guess, I figure, I’m sure). Interestingly, this 
duplicity is also reflected in pragmatic interpretations, where the verbs of belief are variedly 
described as strategies to avoid (epistemic) commitment (Jucker 1986: 149) but also as signals used 
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by politicians to assert their ‘authoritative’ stance (Simon-Vandenbergen 2000), thus imposing 
themselves as trustable sources.  
Obviously the question whether I think should be an ‘evidential verb’, as Aijmer (2009: 72) 
dubs it, or is instead the prototypical expression of epistemic stance (Cappelli 2007) cannot be 
solved without further descriptive research. A comparison to other lexical entries expressing 
‘cognitive attitude’ might be extremely helpful in detecting different combinations of epistemic and 
evidential features in different verbs, thus contrasting the evidential support that characterizes 
English assume or French trouver ‘find’ with the lack of specific evidential sources in English 
think, French croire ‘believe, think’ and penser ‘think’ (see Cappelli 2007 for English verbs and 
Dendale and Van Bogaert 2007 for French). But as suggested in Sections 4.4.1–2, our analysis of 
extragrammatical lexemes should also be consistently matched with what we know from 
grammatical systems, where, in fact, one of the most controversial issues has to do with of 
conjectures (assumptions, generic inferences), variedly interpreted either as prototypical epistemic 
evaluations or as evidential modes of knowing (Palmer 2001: 29–30, Plungian 2010: 46, Squartini 
2016: 63–64).  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The interpretative complexities of the relationship between lexicon and grammar required long 
introductory preliminaries (Sections 4.1–3) in which I surveyed the varied set of theoretical 
solutions adopted to settle the discussion on the relationship between evidentiality and information 
source. Nonetheless, the lines of research summarized in Section 4.4 should have demonstrated that, 
irrespective of one’s theoretical persuasion, lexical expressions of information source can fruitfully 
be compared to the core of evidential grammar, eventually providing a richer understanding of both 
lexicon and grammar. 
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